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My claim is this: What passes for "legal ethics" today is misnamed, of
ignoble birth, and in almost every important respect solipsistic. The sorry
state of "legal ethics" mirrors that of the legal profession itself. I do not
make these claims in order to cultivate cynicism. Lawyers, in the present
crises of social organization, popular discontent, and looming
environmental catastrophe, have a constructive role to play if they will take
on the responsibility to play it. Those who do take on this responsibility can
then develop ethical standards that deal appropriately with the profession's
entitlements and its members' duties. After all, ethical notions are
inevitably grounded in human experience-either to understand it or to
reject its lessons. Our imagination about ethics, as about almost any aspect
of life, is constrained by the historical, social, and cultural situation in which
we find ourselves.
Given the powerful forces that have shaped the present rules by which
the legal profession governs itself, it is easy to become cynical or dispirited.
A quick look at the social upheavals that have occurred in the past two
decades shows us that change is not only possible, but in many areas of
human endeavor inevitable. Or, as the South African legal scholar and
activist Albie Sachs said after Nelson Mandela was released from prison
and the decades of apartheid were being swept away, "[alll revolutions are
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impossible until they happen; then they become inevitable."' Hence the
second part of this paper's title, "Don't Mourn, Organize," is often said to
have been the last words of union hero Joe Hill.2
I have been working at being and becoming a lawyer-if you count my
pre-law school thinking and writing-for more than fifty years. I have
represented lawyers. I have written about lawyers' duties and rights. I have
taught in law schools in the Americas, Europe, Africa, and Asia, focusing
on issues of lawyer responsibility.
In this essay, I will not repeat what I have written on this general
subject of lawyers and society. I have put a list of my work in the footnote;
the articles are all online, and the books are in many libraries.3 This essay is
not, however, an iteration. I try to describe a rather different path to some
of the same conclusions about what lawyers ought to do and with specific
reference to "ethics," which is a name that this conference calls itself.
I. PARADIGM #1: GENTILE AND THE HYPOCRISY OF PROCLAIMED ETHICS
I begin with a quotation from Chief Justice Rehnquist's truculent
opinion in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,4 a 1991 Supreme Court case that
my partner Sam Buffone and I briefed and that I argued on behalf of a
lawyer named Dominic Gentile. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote some of this
opinion for four Justices and some of it for five.5  The issue was the
constitutional limits on attorney pretrial speech.6
I discussed the background to the case in Fighting Injustice:
Dominic was a successful defense lawyer, former faculty member
of the National Criminal Defense College, and published author.
His client was Grady Sanders, who owned a private storage
1. Albie Sachs, Towards a Bill of Rights for a Democratic South Africa, 12 HASTINGS INT'L &
COM. L. REV. 289 (1988-89). Sachs was a banned person during the apartheid period in South Africa,
which meant that when we had meetings in South Africa during that period, it was forbidden to mention
his name. When Nelson Mandela was released from prison, and Albie came back from exile, he was
appointed to the new Constitutional Court. See generally ALBIE SACHS, THE SOFT VENGEANCE OF A
FREEDOM FIGHTER (2000).
2. Joe Hill, alias of Industrial Workers of the World organizer Joseph Hillstrom, was executed
in Utah in 1915. "Don't Mourn, Organize" is a paraphrase from his last letter. See generally PHILIP S.
FONER, THE CASE OF JOE HILL 96 (1965).
3. See generally MICHAEL E. TIGAR, FIGHTING INJUSTICE (2002). I have been writing about
these issues for many years. See, e.g. my books: PERSUASION: THE LITIGATOR'S ART (1999),
EXAMINING WITNESSES (2d ed. 2002), THINKING ABOUT TERRORISM: THE THREAT TO CIVIL LIBERTIES
IN TIMES OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2007), NINE PRINCIPLES OF LITIGATION AND LIFE (2009), and for
an overview of the role of lawyers in social change, LAW AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM (2d ed. 2000).
4. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
5. See id.
6. See id.
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company. The Las Vegas police rented lockboxes from Sanders'
company, and used the boxes to store money and narcotics for use
in a sting operation. The police neglected to tell Sanders what they
were doing.
The money and narcotics disappeared, and the ensuing public
outcry occupied the media for months. Eventually, the police
having denied guilt, the district attorney indicted Sanders. Dom
went to court and got a trial date six months in the future. The night
before, he had carefully studied the rules of professional
responsibility to see what press comment he could make about the
case.
After the arraignment, Dom held a press conference, which he had
the good sense to videotape. He kept within the bounds of proper
comment as he saw them, and he said that the evidence showed that
the Las Vegas police were probably the ones who had stolen the
money and drugs. At the trial, no prospective juror remembered
Dom's press conference, although some jurors recalled public
statements by the police and the district attorney. Dom presented
evidence to support his theory and the jury acquitted Sanders.
Shortly after the trial, the Nevada bar sent Dom a letter saying that
his press conference violated the disciplinary rules and that he was
subject to discipline. A justice of Nevada Supreme Court had
initiated the complaint. Dom put on a thorough defense at the bar
disciplinary hearing, including testimony on his own qualifications
and the opinions of a media expert and a criminal defense lawyer.
The bar found him guilty and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed.
The punishment was a private reprimand, which would do no great
harm to Dom's reputation, but he chose to challenge what the
Nevada authorities had done. And so we filed a petition for
certiorari, making three basic points. First, we said that lawyer
speech should be protected unless it poses a clear and present
danger to the administration of justice. Second, we argued that the
rule under which Dom was punished, based on an ABA Model
Rule, was unconstitutionally vague and broad-indeed,
contradictory. Dom was found to have violated section 2(d) of
Nevada Rule 177, which proscribes uttering "any opinion as to the
guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case."
Section 3(a) of the same rule, however, states that, notwithstanding
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the prohibitions of sections 1 and 2, counsel "may state without
elaboration: a. the general nature of the claim or defense." Third,
we argued that on the facts Dom's press conference was not only
7harmless but also a public service.
The Court's majority held that the then-prevalent ABA Model Rule,
under which Dominic had been disciplined, was unconstitutionally void for
vagueness. That should have ended the case. We won. But a five-Justice
majority, for whom Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, went on to hold that
lawyer speech could be disciplined even if it did not raise a clear and
present danger of harm to a judicial proceeding.9 As Justice Kennedy
pointed out in his dissent from this conclusion, these five Justices ignored a
long history of lawyer speech on public issues.o In the United States, social
issues have been tried and today are being tried in the public forum of trials.
Lawyers in such cases are best-equipped to know the facts and issues.
They are also, by training and in the history of the republic, public
citizens with as much a duty as a right to comment on matters of public
concern. Certainly it was a matter of public interest that the Las Vegas
Police Department was the more likely suspect in the disappearance of
narcotics and money. The jury apparently agreed.
On the way to his conclusion, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote:
More than a century ago, the first official code of legal ethics
promulgated in this country, the Alabama Code of 1887,
warned attorneys to "Avoid Newspaper Discussion of Legal
Matters," and stated that "newspaper publications by an at-
torney as to the merits of pending or anticipated litigation ...
tend to prevent a fair trial in the courts, and otherwise preju-
dice the due administration of justice." H. Drinker, Legal
Ethics 23, 356 (1953). In 1908, the American Bar Associa-
tion promulgated its own code, entitled "Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics." Many States thereafter adopted the ABA Ca-
nons for their own jurisdictions. Canon 20 stated:
"Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or an-
ticipated litigation may interfere with a fair trial in the
Courts and otherwise prejudice the due administration of
7. TIGAR, FIGHTING INJUSTICE, supra note 3, at 265-266.
8. TIGAR, FIGHTING INJUSTICE, supra note 3, at 267.
9. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1038.
10. See id. at 1054-56.
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justice. Generally they are to be condemned. If the ex-
treme circumstances of a particular case justify a statement
to the public, it is unprofessional to make it anonymously.
An ex parte reference to the facts should not go beyond qu-
otation from the records and papers on file in the court; but
even in extreme cases it is better to avoid any ex parte
statement."' 1
This citation of authority illustrates much of the concern I have
expressed. Almost everything is wrong with it. First, the Court's task was
to tell us how much truthful speech on matters of public interest lawyers
should be allowed to give. The Chief Justice began to answer that question
by asking what some lawyers thought about the issue in 1887.12 Justice
Kennedy's opinion, by contrast, began with the historical First Amendment
tradition.13 That tradition is truer to the Constitution's spirit than the
disconnected bar rules on which the Chief Justice relied.14
It is true that the organized bar's view may at times be relevant to
disposition of a constitutional issue involving lawyers. For example, an
accused is entitled to the assistance of counsel, and this means "effective
assistance." 5  A sensible view of what constitutes effective assistance
should draw on the collective experience of lawyers. This is a practical
question, based on the constitutional text and on the history of legal
representation. Therefore, the Court has looked in capital cases to
American Bar Association ("ABA") standards.16  Interestingly, Justice
Scalia, who joined the Rehnquist opinion, rejects reliance on the ABA
standards.17 Similarly, the question of how much process is due will often
turn in part on the cost and effectiveness of a particular kind of remedy, and
again the experience of lawyers and courts is a useful guide.18 But the First
Amendment does not invite this kind of inquiry, and no First Amendment
case supports employing it.
I1. Id. at 1066.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1034-35.
14. See Brief for Petitioner, Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (No. 89-1836),
1991 WL 11007836 at *17- 19 (for a review of the relevant history).
15. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble (2010).
16. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003).
17. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 542 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (deriding reliance on ABA Standards).
18. The leading case remains. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976). What
process is due will depend in great measure upon the risks of an unreliable determination. These risks
are not always financial, for example, child custody may not involve a sum of money, but the process
due should nonetheless be plentiful.
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And then, upon what lawyers does the Chief Justice choose to rely? His
choice illustrates so much that is wrong with what passes for legal ethics.
Let us take it step by step. In Alabama at this time, there were a few
African-American lawyers and some African-American laborer groups who
sought to defend their rights. 19 However, Alabama society as a whole was
white-dominated, and within two decades the Jim Crow system had become
firmly established.2 0 The professional responsibility rules to which Drinker
referred, and on which Chief Justice Rehnquist relied, were drawn by white
lawyers for a white-dominated society, and among the white lawyers by
those who were in command of the profession.
Surely this is some hint that basing constitutional doctrine on the text of
so-called ethics rules is a perilous undertaking. One must also recall that in
1887, when the Alabama rules were adopted,2' the Fourteenth Amendment
was only twenty years old. It had not been held to require the states to
observe any of the rights enshrined in the first ten amendments. Thomas
Goode Jones was the principal architect of the 1887 Code and he drew on
the work of Pennsylvania jurist George Sharswood.22  Jones was an
unregenerate white supremacist. In Alabama politics, he was a consistent
supporter of Jim Crow legislation and also had little use for the idea of
23
gender equality.
In 1908, a leading authority on ethics looked back at the Alabama code
and regretted that its once asserted lofty principles had been eroded.24 He
looked back to a time "when Alabama 'was a homogenous community,
where the law was an honorable profession, and not a trade, and where the
practices of many races and of commercial craft had not destroyed notions
of ethical standards."' 25
In 1908, the American Bar Associations "Canons" represented advice to
the bars of all the states and territories about professional responsibility.2 6
The ABA was all white and all male. The committee that drafted the
19. See J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER 1844-1944,
271-75 (1993).
20. Id.
21. See Allison Marston, Guiding the Profession: The 1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama State
Bar Association, 49 ALA. L. REV. 471, 471 (1998).
22. Id. at 493.
23. See Marston, supra note 21, at 479-81.
24. See Samuel J. Levine, Rediscovering Julius Henry Cohen and the Origins of the Busi-
ness/Profession Dichotomy: A Study in the Discourse of Early Twentieth Century Legal Professionalism,
47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 5-6 (2005).
25. Id. (quoting Charles A. Boston, A Code of Legal Ethics, 20 GREEN BAG 224, 228 (1908)); see
also MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS § 1.03 (3d ed. 2004)
(for more discussion of the early history of ethics drafting).
26. FREEDMAN, supra note 25, at 2-3.
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Canons recommended that Canon 13 say that "contingent fees ... lead to
many abuses," but the 1908 ABA delegates voted simply to insist that such
fees be subject to judicial supervision.27 The treatment of contingent fees is
relevant because then, as now, the contingent fee is a mechanism that
permits those without means to have access to the courts. The distrust of
such fees was allied to restrictions on solicitation of business and the use of
non-legal personnel to obtain legal business. As James Altman has shown
in an insightful article, the 1908 drafters insisted that lawyers were to act as
"gentlemen," moderating any duty of zealous representation by recognizing
their status as "officers of the court." 2 8 The organized bar was ostensibly to
resist the intrusion of market-based money-seeking values into the
profession.2 9 This professed ideal was, however, mostly a justification for
erecting barriers to entry and a disciplinary system that upheld the "old-
fashioned" values of the existing bar members.3 0
Now, a well-established lawyer might be a member of clubs and
associations where he would mix and mingle with the sorts of people who
could afford and might want his services. A lawyer who was not so well off
would not have the same type of opportunity to get clients. The various
prohibitions on stirring up litigation, and turning law into a mere business
were in fact devices to keep the profession in the hands of those who served
the well-to-do and white. This was, indeed, the motivating force of what
the bar's leaders couched in terms of "professionalism."
The organized bar's decision to restrain zealous advocacy echoed a 19th
century debate that usually focused on Lord Brougham's celebrated defense
of the advocate's duty during his defense of Queen Caroline of England:
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in
all the world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all
means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons,
and, among them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in
performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the
destruction which he may bring upon others. Separating the duty of
a patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of
27. Annual Report of the American Bar Association, ABA 61-62 (1908).
28. James M. Altman, Considering the A.B.A.'s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
2395, 2401 (2003).
29. Id.
30. See generally Levine, supra note 24.
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consequences, though it should be his unhappy fate to involve his
country in confusion.3 1
Henry Drinker, whose work Chief Justice Rehnquist cites, did not
participate in the 1908 drafting, but came along soon enough afterwards to
make sure its dominant principles held sway. He became the bar's leading
32
ethics expert in the 1920s. Jerold Auerbach has examined the social
attitudes of the early 20th century bar leaders, and concluded that
"[a]lthough lawyers spoke the language of professionalism, their vocabulary
often masked hostility toward those who threatened the hegemony of
Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture." 33 The mask often fell off. In 1929, Henry
Drinker spoke at the American Bar Association's annual meeting and
openly decried the "Russian Jew boys" and "other foreign Jews" who had
joined the bar and seemingly lowered its ethical standards.34 Walter George
Smith, who was head of the ABA Section on Legal Education in 1911,
openly regretted that the "mixed character of our population" and the
influence of "members of the most ancient race" had lowered the standards
of the profession.
Of course, the ABA did not welcome African-Americans to
membership until 1943, and its admission of a few women in 1918 was by
accident and was repeated only fitfully until the 1930s.3 6 ABA publications
were forums for attacks on Brown v. Board of Education.3 7 The organized
bar of Southern states attacked civil rights lawyers under a variety of so-
called ethical rules, resulting in the Supreme Court's opinion in NACCP v.
31. This is one of the most-often quoted statements of that great English advocate Henry Brough-
am. Monroe H. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham: Advocating at the Edge for Human Rights, 36
HOFSTRA L. REV. 311, 312 n.4 (2007) (provides a view of Brougham's life, work and ethics).
32. Levine, supra note 24, at 8.
33. Levine, supra note 24, at 3 (quoting JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS
AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 99 (1976)).
34. Levine, supra note 24, at 8-9.
35. Levine, supra note 24, at 6-7 (quoting Joint Meeting of Bar Examiners and the Section on
Legal Education of the ABA, 4 AM. L. SCH. REV. 31, 32 (1915)).
36. See Selma Moidel Smith, A New Discovery: The First Women Members of the ABA, ABA
SENIOR LAWYER'S DIVISION 1 (1999), available at http://wlh.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2011/01/smith-a new discovery.pdf; Ololade Olakanmi, Segregation Within National Professional
Associations, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 6, available at www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/eth
ics/segregation.pdf.
37. 347 U.S. 483; see also Eugene Cook & William 1. Potter, The School Segregation Cases:
Opposing the Opinion of the Supreme Court, 42 A.B.A. J. 313 (1956) (a notable example). The authors,
one a public official and the other a prominent lawyer, decry "the commingling of the white and colored
races" and view with horror the effect of the decisions on "the hearts and minds of white children and
their parents." To be sure, the official publication of the bar might have noted opposition to Brown
among lawyers. But this loaded language, typical of the tone of the entire piece, reflects ill on an organ-
ization itself taking only the tiniest of steps to free itself from the vestiges of its own racist and sexist
history.
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Button.38  The Court expanded upon these principles of right to
representation by striking down limits on injured worker access to counsel
in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia.39 The issues in these
cases involved lay intermediaries recruiting clients and making known that
legal services were available to right wrongs.
I recall the late 1960s, when draft calls mounted for the escalating war
in Vietnam. Young men needed guidance about the complex selective
service regulations, and the arbitrary practices of local draft boards. On top
of all this, the director of Selective Service, General Lewis Hershey,
decided that summarily ordering young men to report for induction was an
ideal antidote to militant protests against the war and the draft. Very few
lawyers had the experience, expertise, or even interest to provide competent
legal advice to draft-age men. So, in a tradition that began with faith-based
organizations and quickly spread to campuses and community groups,
trained draft counselors took up the challenge. The organized bar's
response in many cases was to label such efforts the unauthorized practice
of law, and seek to forbid or enjoin it. The law was not only a learned
profession, but had an effective monopoly on letting people know their
rights.
When civil rights demonstrations spread across the South in the wake of
the sit-in movement that began in 1960 (although there had been earlier
examples), local lawyers often refused their services to arrested
demonstrators. And when lawyers from the North showed up to volunteer,
the local bar and judges tried to prevent them from acting on behalf of the
protestors.40
In short, the concept of lawyer ethics with which Chief Justice
Rehnquist began his analysis is the relic of a discredited and discreditable
41process.4
There is, in Chief Justice Rehnquist's version of lawyer ethical codes,
an implicit view of lawyering, as professional activity by and for the social
class that brought these codes into being. Viewing the legal profession as a
whole, Rehnquist has a point. But in the Gentile case, we were not talking
about the main stream of lawyers. The case had nothing to do with lawyers
seeking media attention to peddle their skills, or stir up litigation. It had
nothing to do with reaching out to intermediaries to rake in clients.
38. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 423-26 (1963).
39. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
40. See, e.g., Lefton v. City of Hattiesburg, 333 F.2d 280, 285-86 (5th Cir. 1964) (holding that
local court rules may not be used to bar out-of-state attorneys from defending civil rights of litigants).
41. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1066-68.
2011] 547
OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Dominic Gentile had held a press conference about a pending case, to
provide truthful speech on a matter of deep public concern.4 2 He had done
so only after government agents had consistently portrayed his client as a
criminal.4 3 Gentile's one press conference was held months before a trial,
and no juror recalled hearing it." Gentile had stayed up the night before to
study the professional responsibility limits on what he could and could not
say.45 He was therefore in a tradition of speech by lawyers acting as public
citizens, daring to speak out against perceived injustice, and in a context in
which their professional knowledge provided useful information to the
public. And, perhaps accidentally, he was not hewn from white Anglo-
Saxon stone-he was an Italian-American from Chicago, relocated to Las
Vegas. His was not the polished drawing room rhetorical style of those who
had brought the professional responsibility rules into being.
The Court decided Gentile in 1991.46 In reading the opinions of the bar
officials and judges as the case wound its way from Nevada to Washington,
one might think that criminal defense lawyers were mouthing off with such
frequency and effect that fair adjudication of criminal cases was routinely
endangered. There was little if any evidence of this. Those of us involved
in high-stakes, high-profile litigation saw that prosecutors and police were
47the most effective and dangerous users of media attention in major cases.
The FBI was very good at corralling reporters and giving out tantalizing
details of cases. After all, the crime beat and judicial beat reporters hung
out in buildings where the same cast of prosecutorial and law enforcement
characters were likely to be. The uproar over Dominic Gentile's press
conference was misdirected and spurious. In short, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's professed concern was both one-sided and ahistorical.
II. PARADIGM #2: THE LAWYER AS HUCKSTER
Dominic Gentile announced his name, and that he was an advocate for
his client.48 Listeners could evaluate his message in terms of his admittedly
partisan position. They could do an independent investigation of his claims,
ask public officials to confirm or deny, or simply wait until the client was
42. See id. at 1033-34.
43. See id. at 1034.
44. TIGAR, FIGHTING INJUSTICE, supra note 3, at 265.
45. TIGAR, FIGHTING INJUSTICE, supra note 3, at 265.
46. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1030.
47. TIGAR, FIGHTING INJUSTICE, supra note 3, at 265.
48. Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1033.
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tried and discover that Gentile's statements were backed by evidence that
convinced the jury.49
At the same time that the Supreme Court was wrestling with Gentile's
truthful and open speech, there was a lawyer-sponsored movement afoot to
influence thousands of lawsuits, as well as legislative activity. This
movement was financed by corporations that manufacture lethal products
such as cigarettes, and that provide products and services that sometimes
injure consumers and the public generally. The organizations involved in
this activity were mostly financed by corporate sponsors. Yet, they took
names suggesting they were grass-roots community groups and masked
their message as citizen concern.
Nobody doubts that these organizations and their sponsors have a First
Amendment right to present their views. The issue here is: What were
lawyers doing organizing and directing these activities as part of their
provision of professional legal services? In 2010, documentary filmmaker
Michael Moore posted an article on his website, discussing an outfit called
APCO:
When someone talks about pushing you off a cliff, it's just human
nature to be curious about them. Who are these people, you
wonder, and why would they want to do such a thing?
That's what I was thinking when corporate whistleblower Wendell
Potter revealed that, when "Sicko" was being released in 2007, the
health insurance industry's PR firm, APCO Worldwide, discussed
their Plan B: "Pushing Michael Moore off a cliff."
But after looking into it, it turns out it's nothing personal! APCO
wants to push everyone off a cliff.
APCO was hatched in 1984 as a subsidiary of the Washington, D.C.
law firm Arnold & Porter -- best known for its years of representing
the giant tobacco conglomerate Philip Morris. APCO set up fake
"grassroots" organizations around the country to do the bidding of
Big Tobacco. All of a sudden, "normal, everyday, in-no-way-
employed-by-Philip Morris Americans" were popping up
everywhere. And it turned out they were outraged -- outraged! -- by
exactly the things APCO's clients hated (such as, the government
49. See id.
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telling tobacco companies what to do). In particular, they were
"furious" that regular people had the right to sue big corporations
... you know, like Philip Morris. . .
Right about now you may be wondering: how many Americans get
pushed off a cliff by Big Tobacco every year? The answer is
443,000 Americans die every year due to smoking. That's a big
cliff.
With this success under their belts, APCO created "The
Advancement of Sound Science Coalition." TASSC, funded partly
by Exxon, had a leading role in a planned campaign by the fossil
fuel industry to create doubt about global warming. The problem
for Big Oil speaking out against global warming, according to the
campaign's own leaked documents, was that the public could see
the "vested interest" that oil companies had in opposing
environmental laws. APCO's job was to help conceal those oil
company interests.50
Yes, APCO was founded by Arnold & Porter. Here is a description of it by
its general counsel:
APCO itself is a multidisciplinary practice, a firm that combines the
skills of many professional disciplines - including lawyers - to
assist its clients in addressing public affairs, government relations,
and strategic communications issues wherever they arise throughout
the world. APCO today has some 250 professionals operating in
governmental capitals and commercial centers throughout the
Americas, Europe, and Asia. We are successful at what we do
precisely because we are good at "thinking outside the box," at
fashioning innovative strategies and creative solutions for our
clients' problems. Our ability to do that results directly from the
quality and multidisciplinary skills of our professional staff. The
MDP concept is at the heart of what APCO is - and it always has
been.
APCO was created in 1984 as a wholly owned subsidiary of Arnold
& Porter. It was intended to complement several existing practice
50. Michael Moore, How Corporate America Is Pushing Us All Off a Cliff,
MICHAELMOORE.COM (Nov. 19, 2010 PM), available at http://www.michaelmoore.com/words/mike-
friends-blog/how-corporate-america-pushing-us-all.
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areas within the law firm by bringing to bear the talents and
expertise of a number of non-lawyer professionals, particularly in
legislative and related public policy fields. APCO was conceived as
a vehicle for broadening the scope of services offered by Arnold &
Porter to its clients and as a means for offering services in a more
efficient and cost-effective manner. It grew out of the conviction
that - at least for certain types of matters - an interdisciplinary
approach combining the skills of lawyers and non-lawyer
professionals could lead to better and more creative solutions for
client problems. The clients evidently agreed since APCO's
business grew and the company expanded. In 1991, when APCO
was sold by Arnold & Porter to Grey Advertising (APCO's current
parent company), the firm had increased to some 35 persons serving
numerous clients on a wide variety of issues.51
Beginning in 1986, APCO was a major player with the American Tort
Reform Association ("ATRA") and with the growing number of Citizens
Against Lawsuit Abuse ("CALA") entities that began to appear in various
parts of the country. 5 2 ATRA and the CALAs were mostly funded and
directed by corporate and insurance interests, but they presented themselves
to the public as grass-roots entities directed and financed by "ordinary"
citizens.5 3 ATRA and CALA achieved great success in state legislatures.54
For example, in Texas they helped secure passage of legislation that
virtually barred lawsuits based on consumption of "natural" products, which
expressly included tobacco. This state legislation prevented Texas Attorney
General Dan Morales from suing Big Tobacco in state court. He therefore
hired private lawyers who brought a RICO-based federal lawsuit that Texas
settled on the eve of trial for at least $17.5 billion dollars. The private
lawyers had invested about $50 million of their own money in the lawsuit.
Even after their success, Governor George Bush and Morales's Republican
successor as Attorney General, John Cornyn, did everything they could to
see that these lawyers did not receive a just fee for their otherwise
uncompensated work. 5
51. Statement of James W. Jones, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/johnson2.html./ (last visited June 23, 2011).
52. See Carl Deal & Joanne Doroshow, The CAIA Files: The Secret Campaign by Big Tobacco
and Other Major Industries to Take Away Your Rights, CTR. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY 9 (2000),
available at www.centerjd.orglarchives/studies/CALAFiles.pdf.
53. Id. at 14.
54. Id. at 42-43.
55. This account is based on my personal experience as counsel for the private lawyers.
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In addition to legislative success, these factitious grass-roots campaigns
had success with potential jurors. Civil trial judges report that jurors in civil
cases today are much more likely to come to court with the attitude that
plaintiffs are trying to rip off insurance companies.5 6 Reactionary judges
demonstrate hostility to plaintiffs by setting aside jury verdicts and
preaching the gospel of summary judgment to terminate cases.
APCO's founders understood that there were professional responsibility
issues inherent in putting lawyer and non-lawyer services under the same
roof.57 They took steps to address what they understood these to be, but the
steps they took related almost entirely to policing the relationships among
the law firm, its clients and the subsidiary non-lawyer entities. That is,
clients would not be pressured to use APCO's services, and APCO would
disclose its relationship to Arnold & Porter in all its dealings with clients
and potential clients.
In 1991, largely under the influence of its 60,000 member Section of
Litigation, the ABA adopted a ban on law firm ancillary services, which
today parade under the name Multi-Disciplinary Practice (or "MDP"). 59
That ban was effective for one year and was reversed in 1992. 0
In 1999, an ABA Commission reported on MDP's and issued proposals
that let the MDP drive forward.6 ' Professor Schneyer described the
Commission's work in terms that agree with my view that the "let lawyers
be lawyers" theory amounts to abandonment of a search for principle:
The Commission regards loyalty, competence, confidentiality, and
independent professional judgment as the legal profession's "core
values." One can hardly disagree. But core values and useful
regulatory concepts are two different things. The bar and the courts
have spent decades giving legal meaning and regulatory
significance to three of these values but not the fourth. Conflict-of-
interest rules and disqualification decisions have defined the
lawyer's duty of loyal and spelled out its implications. Malpractice
decisions have fleshed out the duty of competence. Ethics opinions
and case law have elaborated on the duty of confidentiality. By
contrast, the regulatory history of "independent judgment" is so thin
56. Based on conversations with trial judges at judicial conferences.
57. See Statement ofJames W. Jones, supra note 51.
58. See Statement ofJames W. Jones, supra note 51.
59. Ted Schneyer, Policymaking and the Perils of Professionalism: The ABA's Ancillary Busi-
ness Debate as a Case Study, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 363, 364 (1993).
60. Id.
61. Ted Schneyer, Multidisciplinary Practice, Professional Regulation, and the Anti-Interference
Principle in Legal Ethics, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1469, 1469-71 (2000).
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that the value is dismissed in some quarters as a professional
"shibboleth." The sorts of interference lawyers must resist or be
shielded from to play their proper role remain particularly unclear.
In academic parlance, "independent judgment" and "interference"
are under-theorized legal concepts.6 2
Today, the activities of MIDPs such as APCO are regulated by Model Rule
5.7, which reads:
Rule 5.7 Responsibilities Regarding Law-Related Services
(a) A lawyer shall be subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct
with respect to the provision of law-related services, as defined in
paragraph (b), if the law-related services are provided:
(1) by the lawyer in circumstances that are not distinct from the
lawyer's provision of legal services to clients; or
(2) in other circumstances by an entity controlled by the lawyer
individually or with others if the lawyer fails to take reasonable
measures to assure that a person obtaining the law-related services
knows that the services are not legal services and that the
protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not exist.
(b) The term "law-related services" denotes services that might
reasonably be performed in conjunction with and in substance are
related to the provision of legal services, and that are not prohibited
as unauthorized practice of law when provided by a non-lawyer.63
Rule 5.7 was adopted after an ABA Commission studied MDP. Its report
says:
The legal profession should adopt and maintain rules of
professional conduct that protect its core values, independence of
professional judgment, protection of confidential client information,
and loyalty to the client through avoidance of conflicts of interest,
but should not permit existing rules to unnecessarily inhibit the
62. Id.
63. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY R. 5.7 (2002).
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development of new structures for the more effective delivery of
services and better public access to the legal system. 4
Neither Rule 5.7, nor any related provision, addressed the concern that
outfits like APCO were in the business of influencing litigation and
legislation without disclosing to legislators, the public, or potential jurors
the nature and source of their financing and organization. Indeed, they
actively concealed and falsified their sponsorship. At the risk of repetition,
I iterate that this sort of participation in the processes of government is
probably protected by the First Amendment. Our issue is the relationship
between APCO and similar entities and a sensible view of the legal
profession.
The issue may be illustrated with a simple example: Ms. Wilson has
been injured by a defective product. She sues the manufacturer, who is
represented by counsel provided by the insurance company. Ms. Wilson's
lawyer, Ms. Smith, holds a press conference to announce the lawsuit and to
make a plea that anyone else injured by this product should come forward to
provide relevant information. Ms. Smith may be subject to professional
discipline under Model Rule 3.6, as amended in the wake of Gentile.65 Her
comments might be found to raise a risk of impact on the Wilson case.
The defendant manufacturer and its insurance company are both
contributors to ATRA and the local CALA. Billboards, newspaper
advertisements, and radio and TV spots have appeared for the past several
years denouncing "lawsuit abuse." The ad campaigns have been fashioned
by a legal team working with ATRA and the CALA group. That legal team
is organized along the same lines as APCO. There is no rule of professional
responsibility that could apply to the defendant's or insurance company's
conduct. It is almost beyond the reach of judicial control. It is not
considered "lawyer speech," and therefore is not subject to the diluted
speech standard that Gentile reserves for lawyers. The only remedy that
Ms. Smith might have is to seek in discovery her opponents' activity, and to
ask that jurors be told of this activity and ask whether any of them have
been subjected to it. This would be the same sort of inquiry one would
make in a high-profile case, asking jurors whether they had read or heard
anything relevant to their decisional process.
Ms. Smith's and her opponents' media contacts are symmetrical in the
sense that in both instances there is speech about a matter of public concern.
64. James W. Jones, Redefining Lawyers' Work: Multidisciplinary Practice Focusing the MDP
Debate: Historical and Practical Perspectives, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 989, 999 (1999).
65. See generally Gentile, 501 U.S. 1030; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY R. 3.6
(2002).
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They are not symmetrical to the extent that her opponents are putting up a
false front about the organization and financing of their efforts and are
spreading false and misleading material about the issues-as the energy and66
tobacco companies cited by Michael Moore were doing.
I am not the first to notice this asymmetry. In articles in the
Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, Professor Beardslee suggested
modifying Rule 3.6 to regulate lawyer speech and lawyer-controlled speech.
His proposed changes to the current rule are underlined:
RULE 3.6: Publicity About Legal Matters
(a) A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the
investigation, litigation, or analysis of a legal matter shall not make
an extrajudicial statement or substantially assist his client in making
an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know will be disseminated by means of public
communication and
(1) knows or reasonably should know would have a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in
the matter regardless of whether an adjudicative proceeding
currently is or will be pending, OR
(2) knows or reasonably should know is groundless or would
mislead or deceive others about the legal controversy. 6 7
Neither Professor Beardslee nor anybody else imagines that this rule
will be adopted. Nor, given the Supreme Court's campaign finance
decisions-essentially holding that spending anonymous corporate money is
a form of protected "speech" under the First Amendment-can one be sure
that such a rule would survive the current fashion in constitutional analysis.
Moreover, the rule does not address the problem of anonymous or
mislabeled speech.
Returning to the ABA Commission explanation, what are the "core
values"? Are they only the ones of confidentiality, loyalty, and conflict-free
representation? One hopes not, or at least one would hope not if the goal is
to create a system of "ethics" that is worthy of the name. The obliquity of
those who have argued for so paltry a list of limits on MDP illustrates the
problem. Professor Robert Gordon has cast the debate in terms of
66. See Moore, supra note 50.
67. Michele DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, Installment Two:
How Far Should Corporate Attorneys Go?, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1119, 1178 (2010).
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"constraints" and "temptations" that may "compromise the exercise of a
lawyer's independent judgment." 68 That is, MDP proponents, who have
pretty much carried the day, succeeded by seeing the issues and dangers as
related only to client service. And in today's world, clients with money are
the predominant and favored consumers of legal services. The format of
law firm MDP efforts has overwhelmingly been in the service of those
clients who can and do pay.69 Hence, the issues that Michael Moore and the
studies of ATRA and CALAs have raised and studied.
The MDP controversy has been resolved, at least for the time being,
along the lines advocated by Professor Robert Gordon and the leading lights
of APCO. Their justifications for MDP reveal as much about the supposed
role of legal ethics rules as about the specific issues in the MDP debate.
Hence, they help us see the paradigm of the lawyer as huckster. Professor
Gordon's case for the MDP was:
The point is simply that lawyers already experience many forms of
pressure and constraint on their independent judgment. The case
against multi-disciplinary practice would have to be that it would
impose additional pressures and constraints, quantitatively and
qualitatively more severe in kind and degree, to those that already
exist.70
Professor Gordon also cites the pressures on in-house counsel to toe the
corporate line, and the inducements of insurance company lawyers to serve
the company rather than the insured.7 1 If the system can handle these
problems without special and stringent regulation, the argument goes, there
is no need for MDP restraints of the kind that the ABA had for a year and
then abandoned.
James Jones, APCO's vice-president and general counsel, was more
direct. Leave the MDPs alone, he said:
[T]he only effective line of defense for preserving the professional
independence of lawyers is the integrity of the individual lawyer
himself. If the bar is truly concerned about such issues - and I
would certainly hope it would be - it should focus on making
certain that individual lawyers have the training and the procedures
68. Letter from Robert W. Gordon, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/commission-multidisciplinary practice/
gordon.html (last visited June 23, 2011).
69. Id.
70. Jones, supra note 64, at 997.
71. Jones, supra note 64, at 997-98.
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for making principled decisions when called upon in particular
situations.72
The MDP debate is now muted.
Gordon's and Jones's positions reveal the bankruptcy of the current
debate about professional responsibility, or ethics, or whatever name one
wishes to use. Jones's argument is simply a version of the deregulation
mantra: Leave the lawyers alone in their pursuit of profit and professional
satisfaction.73 The law schools and inspirational bar meetings will instill
good values and we need not worry.
Professor Gordon's view is certainly ahistorical and almost surely
uninformed. The pressures on lawyers to behave in unprofessional ways are
already present, have increased in the past thirty years, and are largely
unregulated by existing rules and rule-enforcement structures. The creation,
growth and activity of MDPs have simply exacerbated tendencies that were
already at work. I examine this assertion in the following sections of this
essay.
As for Mr. Jones of APCO, the "let lawyers be lawyers" strophe is a
cop-out. The discussion of ethics or professional responsibility rules
assumes that there is such a thing as a "legal profession" to which all
lawyers belong and that commands respect for certain norms. Mr. Jones
does not expressly describe that imagined profession, although his reference
to "the individual lawyer" revealingly adds "himself," so that one may
assume that in his world-view, all the lawyers have a certain chromosomal
consistency.74 With or without gender specificity, if Jones's assumption is
correct, as a starting place for discussing rules, then Mr. Jones's
recommendation is out of order. He also adopts, without justification, a
marketeer-entrepreneur model of lawyer behavior without an examination
for doing so and without addressing the consequences of such a choice.
III. PARADIGM #3: MALLARD V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT"- THE BAR
DUCKS
The Federal District Court in Iowa had a practice of requiring lawyers
to accept appointment to represent indigent civil litigants.76 It based its
appointment authority on 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), which authorizes courts to
72. See Jones, supra note 64, at 998.
73. See Jones, supra note 64, at 999.
74. See Jones, supra note 64, at 998.
75. Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296 (1989).
76. Id. at 298.
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"request" lawyers to provide such service. 7  Mallard was a lawyer,
appointed to represent prisoners in their civil rights suit, who challenged the
court's authority to require him to serve. 78 The Supreme Court held, in a 5-
4 decision, that "request" means only "ask" and that it gives no power to
compel. 7 9  The Court did not decide whether there might be an inherent
judicial power to compel.80 It also said that a request confronts the lawyer
with "an important ethical decision," though the Court did not cite any
ethical rules that would guide or dictate such a decision."' Justice Brennan
wrote for the majority, and it is difficult to see where in his view of the law
and lawyers his analysis fits.82 Justices Stevens, Marshall, Blackmun and
O'Connor dissented.83 Justice Kennedy wrote a concurrence expressing the
84hope that lawyers would voluntarily take on indigent cases.
The case attracted several amicus briefs. The Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, in a brief authored by, among others, Ogden Lewis
and John Koeltl, argued that "request" was simply a polite form of
"compel," and that the statute codified an inherent judicial power to require
lawyers to assist indigent people. The brief was eloquent, and Justice
Stevens's dissenting opinion reflected many of its arguments. 86  The
Association wrote:
As an officer of the court, a member of the bar enjoys certain
powers that others do not possess. For example, admission to the
bar creates a license not only to advise and counsel clients, but also
to appear in court, try cases, and cause persons to become witnesses
in court and for depositions. Such benefits, however, come with
corresponding burdens, one of which is that a lawyer, as an officer
77. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)).
78. Id. at 299-301.
79. Id. at 301-302.
80. See Mallard, 490 U.S. at 301-310.
81. Id. at 308.
82. See id. at 298-310. I remember having lunch with Justice Brennan around this time, and
asking about his views. He waved the question away.
83. Id. at 311-18.
84. Id. at 310-11. Some time after Mallard, which was decided in 1989, 1 began regularly plying
the Atlantic Intracoastal Waterway, which is crossed by dozens of drawbridges. Some of these have
fixed opening times. Others open when a boat approaches and signals. I remember hearing on the radio
one novice captain hailing the bridge and saying "do you open on demand?" The bridge tender respond-
ed, "no. We open on request." "On demand" is in fact the language in the official maritime documents,
but regardless of the word, the bridge opens when the captain asks.
85. Brief of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York as Amicus Curiae, Mallard v.
United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296 (1989) (No. 87-1490), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 679, at
*5-6, *9.
86. See Mallard, 490 U.S. at 311 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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of the court, is obligated to represent indigents for no compensation
upon court order.
As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently stated:
There is a symbiotic relationship between the court and the
attorneys who are members of its bar. The court's responsibility for
the administration of justice would be frustrated were it unable to
enlist or require the services of those who have by virtue of their
87license, a monopoly on the provision of such services.
True, the Association found it difficult to find a rule of professional
responsibility that unambiguously compels pro bono service.88 It resorted
instead to tradition, "ethical considerations" attached to the mandatory rules,
and the inherent power of courts.89 As of 2010, the New York Rule of
Professional Conduct 6.1 provided only that attorneys should "aspire" to
perform twenty hours of pro bono legal services to poor persons per year,
but added that this rule "is not intended to be enforced through the
disciplinary process." 90 Rather, the rule speaks of "aspirational goals ...
without legal consequences."91
The State Bar of California, in a brief signed by Morrison & Foerster,
argued not only that the statute does not authorize judicial compulsion, but
that it would violate the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause if it did.9 2 It
costs money to maintain a law practice, the California Bar argued, and
litigation has become so complicated and expensive that lawyers should not
have to shoulder the burden of helping people without money to engage in
it.9 3 The signers of this brief made this argument without a hint of irony.
These lawyers, bluntly put, decline to take any responsibility for the fact
that this complexity and costliness freezes out lawyer-deprived citizens
from meaningful access to justice.94 The bar encourages lawyers to provide
pro bono services, but it argues that costs of any widespread access to
justice should be borne as part of publicly-funded legal services programs.
This argument, replete with financial data about the expense of law practice,
87. Brieffor the Association ofthe Barofthe City ofNew York, supra note 85, at *20- 21.
88. Brief for the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 85, at *31-32.
89. See generally Brief for the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 85.
90. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT R. 6.1 (New York 2009).
90. Id.
92. Brief of the State Bar of California as Aicus Curiae, Mallard v. United States District Court,
490 U.S. 296 (1989) (No. 87-1490), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 677, at *7.
93. Id. 1 -1t at *3.
94. See id. at *8-9.
95. Id. at *24-25.
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was written after the Reagan-era limitations on legal services programs had
already been enacted and enforced, and after such successful programs as
California Rural Legal Services had experienced significant funding
cutbacks. That is, the bar was writing at a time when it was obvious to
anyone that public funding of adequate legal services was unlikely to
happen. The bar's argument that financially-strapped lawyers would not be
able to provide fully adequate legal services took no account whatever of
the caseloads routinely borne by public defenders and legal services
lawyers. No representation, the argument seems to be, is better than
representation by lawyers who must labor under financial pressure. 9 6
Needless to say, the bar's argument did not contain a vision of the lawyer's
role as champion of justice.
The Fifth Amendment argument was a remarkable exegesis on laissez-
faire economic ideology.97 Of course, citizens are sometimes called upon to
provide service to their government at less than market rates. Conscription
is an example. Nominally private property may be used by the public for all
sorts of things, including leafleting and union-organizing activity. And
surely the bar's virtual monopoly on access to justice should not be
guaranteed without lawyers paying some price for the privilege.
The bar's position in 1989 was the position it had taken in 1970-71 in a
case in which I was involved.98 In 1970, Rosalio Mutioz was indicted in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California for
refusing to submit to induction into the armed forces.99 He had applied for
conscientious objector status, but the Selective Service System had denied
his claim. Mufioz had been student body president at UCLA, at whose law
school I was then teaching. He asked me to represent him pro bono and I
agreed. By that time, I had written a book on representing draft registrants
and had litigated a number of such cases. I went to his arraignment. I was
not a member of the California bar. The local rule said that a lawyer who
was not a member of the California bar could appear pro hac vice, provided
that he did not "'maintain an office in this District for the practice of
law."'" The arraignment judge interpreted the rule as barring me from
appearing, even with local counsel. I noted that my law professor office at
UCLA was not "for the practice of law," so I was not competing with local
96. See id. at *22-23.
97. See Brief of the State Bar of California as Arnicus Curiae, Mallard v. United States District
Court, 490 U.S. 296 (1989) (No. 87-1490), 1988 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 677, at *31.
98. Munoz v. Hauk, 439 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Curtis v. Munoz, 404
U.S. 1059 (1972). 1 have given details of the dispute in, FIGHTING INJUSTICE, supra note 3, at 134-41.
99. Id. at 1177.
100. Id. at 1178 (quoting RULES OF THE DIST. CT. FOR THE CENTRAL DIST. OF CALL R. 1(d)).
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lawyers. Moreover, there was already some authority for the proposition
that membership in the state bar where a federal court sat was not required
for someone who was representing someone in a federal matter, particularly
a criminal case, and particularly pro bono. The cases in which northern
lawyers had come South to defend civil rights activists were particularly
relevant. 01
No matter, said the judge, and his ruling was upheld by the judge to
whom the case was assigned for trial. Muiioz and I sought mandamus.' 02
Not only did all but two of the local judges resist the application, the
California Bar designated three of its distinguished members to defend the
local rule.'o3 Not only did they do so-all the way to the United States
Supreme Court-they also argued that the combination of radical Mufioz
and his radical lawyer created (unstated) risks to the justice system.
The court of appeals upheld Mufioz's and my position. The Supreme
Court denied review. On remand, we moved to disqualify all the judges
who had opposed my admission, and the case was tried before a judge who
granted a judgment of acquittal. This same judge also admitted me pro hac
vice in a case involving national security wiretapping, which on the merits
was the first decision holding that dispensing with a warrant in such cases
was impermissible.10 4
IV. PARADIGM #4 - AN OUTBREAK OF HONESTY
Law firms hire and fire associates, and expel partners, for many reasons.
The limits on their power to do so have been litigated in courts and before
bar associations.105  There is extensive literature on such cases, and the
economic troubles of recent years have focused attention on the issues. But
suppose a law firm partner detects that others in the firm are violating rules
of professional responsibility? Suppose the partner finds that her colleagues
are committing fraud on a client?
Such a case-well-chronicled and therefore not requiring extensive
treatment here-is that of Colette Bohatch.'" She was a partner in the
Washington office of Butler & Binion, a Texas-based law firm.107 She
believed that one of her partners was over-billing one of the firm's major
101. See e.g., Lefton, supra note 40.
102. Munoz, 439 F.2d at 1178.
103. See id. at 1179.
104. United States v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 424 (Cent. Dist. Cal. 1971). My admission pro hac vice
is noted in Munoz, 439 F.2d. at 1178-79 and accompanying footnote.
105. See generally Douglas R. Richmond, Expelling Law Firm Partners, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 93,
104-22 (2009).
106. Id. at 117; see also Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1998).
107. Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 544.
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clients.'0o She did the right thing with her concerns, by reporting them to
her partners and to the firm's management committee.'1 Under Model
Rule 8.3(a), she had the option and almost certainly the duty to report her
well-founded suspicions "to the appropriate professional authority,"
probably the bar itself. 0
The firm's guiding powers concluded that there had been no over-
billing, and the client pronounced itself satisfied."' This inquiry bore signs
more of circling the wagons rather than seriously confronting the issue. The
law firm expelled Ms. Bohatch from the partnership." 2
The Texas Supreme Court, with two dissents, upheld the expulsion." 3
It did so by two analytical devices. First, it held that a partnership is a
creature of contractual volition.1 4  But Butler & Binion's partnership
agreement did not impose limits on the reasons why a partner could be
expelled' 15, and so presumptively none existed.
The second device was to turn to what the court regarded as the basic
idea of a partnership.1 6 As Judge Cardozo long ago reminded us, partners
have duties of disclosure and honor towards one another that are far greater
than mere contractual ties.'1 If the sense of mutual trust is broken, a
partnership may expel one of its members. This theory of partnership
mutual agency has a sound footing in legal history, certainly as applied to
ordinary business partnerships that are engaged in the sale of goods and
services. But as the dissenters pointed out, the theory assumes that the
partnership and its members have no duties to the outside world greater than
those that may be imposed by the laws of contract, tort, property and public
law."8 That is, if the bar disciplinary authorities, or the client, want to
create public scandal by charging the firm with impropriety, that would be
acceptable. But if a member of the firm raises an issue of professional
conduct, and seeks to steer the firm towards a proper view of its obligation
to clients or the public, the partnership may expel the member for that
conduct.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Richmond, supra note 105, at 117 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a)).
111. Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 544.
112. Id. at 544-45.
113. See generally id.
114. Id. at 545-46.
115. Id. at 546.
116. Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 545-47.
117. See Jacob A. Stein, A Note About Such Things as Fiduciary, UPA, and RUPA, DC BAR (Apr.
2011), available at http://www.dcbar.org/forlawyers/resources/publications/washingtonlawyer/apr
il_201 1/spectator.cfm.
118. See Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 558-562.
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To put the matter as Henry Drinker might, perhaps, have done, the law
firm need have no sense of obligation to the rules of professional conduct
than "merely following the methods their fathers had been using in selling
shoe strings and other merchandise[.]"" 9
V. So WHY ARE THEY CALLED-OR FORMERLY CALLED-LEGAL
ETHICS?
These four paradigmatic events in the law-Gentile, the MDP debate,
Mallard and Bohatchl2 0-show us the bar, not as it wishes to be seen, but in
action. It is quick to defend its monopoly. But one should note that rules
such as that in the California federal court will fall by the wayside under the
pressure of economic events. The California rule was designed to keep all
the "foreign" lawyers from competing with locals.121 Such rules began to
crumble with the spread of multistate bar examinations and reciprocal
admissions. With the growth of multi-city law firms, with their hundreds
and even thousands of lawyers, "multi-jurisdictional practice," (or "MJP")
is a new mantra. There is a fierce debate within the bar as to how far these
"artificial" restraints on provision of legal services should give way to
permitting any lawyer admitted anywhere to practice federal and
international law. California and Florida continue, however, to enforce
relatively strict rules against out-of-state lawyers coming in to practice, due
no doubt to the popularity of these states as places to live. The migration
urge seems to hit particularly hard among older lawyers who would like to
live in a "sunshine state," but they will continue to find the barriers higher
than in other places.
There is a progressive aspect to the liberalizing MJP rules, as they make
more lawyers available for civil rights cases in places where the local bar is
not responsive. But the change has been driven by the economic interest of
the large firms.
The debate over MJP rule changes lays bare a central conflict over the
purpose and meaning of "ethics," "professional responsibility," and
"professional conduct." Until forty years ago, the American bar was
dominated by local and state associations. The power in the ABA was
drawn from the leadership of those associations. Then, the "sections" of the
ABA, led by Litigation and Torts/Insurance Practice, began to assert
themselves. They brought a more "national" view, and struggled to increase
their power over ABA activities and positions. I observed these
119. Levine, supra note 24, at 8.
120. See discussion infra Parts 1, 11, 111, and IV.
121. See RULES OF THE DIST. CT. FOR THE CENTRAL DIST. OF CALL R. 1(d)).
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developments in the 1970s through 1990s, in various leadership positions in
the Section of Litigation, during which time I was Chair, became the ABA's
largest section. Because the sections focused on particular practice areas,
they were much more in touch with the day-to-day concerns of their
members than was the "national" ABA establishment. Thus, there has been
a struggle between the ABA which is considered a collection of independent
fiefdoms, and an ABA that looks beyond state and local boundaries.
Despite the section's increasing clout, the local and state bars continue
to insist on their power to exclude "outsiders" from activity in their arenas.
Thus, "unauthorized practice" covers not only the activity of those who are
not lawyers, but also of those admitted in other jurisdictions who want to
advise clients and litigate in local courts. But increasingly these interests
give way to the economic interests of those who envision a "national" bar
with relatively few limits on what a lawyer from one jurisdiction may do in
another. Resistance to MJP rules retreats to a focus on keeping control of
state and local law concerns by limiting the kinds of practice that outsiders
may engage in. The outsiders, in their turn, have tended to adapt to these
limits by opening satellite offices, fueling the movement towards multi-city
mega-firms.
The MDP debate reveals some of the same stresses. The lawyer in solo
or small firm practice is relatively unlikely to want a satellite public
relations or lobbying operation. It is the large firms that have led the drive
to legitimize such things. And when a solo lawyer like Dominic Gentilel22
raises his voice in the public forum to defend his pilloried client, he is
directly in the sights of the lawyer comment rules that have been framed in
ways that, as we have seen, have no impact on the MDP firms.
When I talk about advocacy, I usually mention that we use words to
persuade jurors: witnesses testify, lawyers argue, and the judge instructs.
There may be objects, documents, and pictures as well, but these come to
court attached to and supported by the sponsoring words of a testifier. As
advocates we must take care that the words we and the witnesses use
conjure the very image that we have in mind and not some other. To
illustrate this point, I say to the audience, "Close your eyes. I am going to
say a word. When I do, check the image in your mind. OK, 'pediatrician.'
How many of you have in mind a male pediatrician? How many a female
pediatrician?" And so it would go with any number of words: truck, motel,
and so on. 123
122. See generally Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1038.
123. On the power of signs and symbols, see generally MICHAEL E. TIGAR, THE POWER OF MYTH:
JUSTICE, SIGNS & SYMBOLS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, LITIGATION 25 (1999).
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The word "lawyer" calls to mind any of a hundred mental images,
depending on the listener, and on his or her social, cultural, ethnic, and
religious milieu. In this sense, Gordon and Jones are right to suggest that
there is no single image of lawyer.124 However, the anecdotal evidence that
I have been seeing for the past fifty years suggests that all the lawyers, in
whatever context they work, have been and are subject to the same sorts of
pressures to bring their conduct within the dominant rules imposed by the
holders of political and economic power.
Who are these "individual lawyer[s]?"l 2 5 Let me trace the basis for my
descriptions and the ensuing analysis. I have represented lawyers in many
practice settings. I have worked closely with corporations and their general
counsels. I have worked with legal services and public defender lawyers. I
have negotiated with prosecutors and even joined a prosecution team or
two. I was Chair of the 60,000 member ABA Section of Litigation during
some of the fights over revising professional responsibility rules. And I
have testified as an expert witness on professional responsibility issues. So
let us begin with a brief survey of practice settings:
A- The partner in a large multi-city law firm, whose share may be
more than one million dollars per year, or whose firm may have so
aggressively courted the economic fallacies of the past twenty years
that it may join some other large firms on the brink of extinction.
- The lawyer who defends civil cases on referral from insurance
companies and corporations. Many of these lawyers are in
organizations such as the Defense Research Institute. I have spoken
to groups of them. They increasingly find that their work is
controlled by bean-counting executives who sharply limit the way
the lawyer is to approach the case. This may be very well when the
lawyer is directly retained by the client. But there is plenty of
anecdotal evidence that when the insurance carrier retains and
controls counsel, decisions are being made that often do not put the
insured's interest first. The insurance company retained lawyer
comes to court with strict and often unrealistic limits on settlement
authority, banking on stringing things out so that plaintiffs counsel
will have to accept. After all, actually going to trial these days is
expensive. These lawyers are uncomfortable with the restrictions
but often do not know how to push back.
124. See discussion infra Part 11.
125. See Jones, supra note 64, at 998.
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- The Legal Services lawyer, paid by state or federal government
but carrying a huge caseload and operating under restrictions that
forbid resort to such things as class actions. The Supreme Court has
held that some restrictions on client services are unconstitutional,
but nobody imagines that those who need these lawyers will find
that the resources available to protect their rights are anywhere near
those available to those who have infringed those rights.
- The honorable lawyers who understand that a law license
requires honest and ardent client service and a healthy dose of pro
bono activity.
A The in-house lawyers for corporations. Many of these lawyers
toil in an honorable tradition. They spot potential difficulties and
alert management to them. They manage litigation with in-house
and outside lawyers with attention to professional standards.
However, I have found that in-house legal departments are being
reorganized to promote efficiency at the expense of professional
standards.
-k The prosecutor, under pressure from the police (federal, state,
and local) to bring charges and get convictions. Capital cases
provide us with the most dramatic illustration of the pressures under
which these lawyers labor and how they feel compelled to respond.
However, the pressures are the same, though different in degree,
throughout the system that calls itself criminal justice. Capital
crimes are by nature disturbing to the community. The police
apparatus wants to reassure the citizenry that all is well, the
perpetrators are caught and that something called justice will soon
and visibly be done. Haste and a natural tendency to overlook
suspect rights in this quest produce the errors that we have seen and
prosecutors go along with the wrongdoing.
- The court-appointed lawyer, whose contract is with the state
entity that pays the agreed fee, and not by the defendant being
represented. The "agreement" to represent the client is a fake
bargain, in which the client, as the person most concerned, has
almost no control over the terms of service, and the lawyer operates
within a fairly narrow range of possible choices. I have written
about these issues here now and will not repeat that analysis.
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One could recite dozens of other examples, showing the variety of
practice settings and the corresponding pressures on lawyer conduct and
motivations. There is no such thing as "the individual lawyer himself" or
even "herself." He or she is a fiction created on a particular occasion for a
particular purpose. He is "the man on the Clapham omnibus" which an
English judge envisioned as arbiter of sexual mores. 126 He is the
"reasonable man" of negligence law, whose vaunted prudence led A.P.
Herbert to say that "[a]ll solid virtues are his, save only that peculiar quality
by which the affection of other men is won."1 2 7
Put another way, the idea of an unguided "individual" decision ignores
the fact that decisions are not truly individual. How we decide what to do is
a product of our social, historical, and cultural circumstance. We need not
wade into the nature-nurture controversy to see at least this much. Only a
little experience with real life clients will teach the same lesson. Our
decisions are also influenced by what we perceive as principles of conduct,
whether derived from some internal moral compass or perceived as binding
because imposed by recognized authority.
It is legitimate to ask, therefore, what is to guide lawyer decisions about
how to behave, and from what legitimate source would such principles
spring. The history of "ethics" codes, and their shaping over the past 150
years, leads to one conclusion. Those codes have nothing to do with ethics,
properly so-called. The codes originated in the desire of lawyers to define
their monopoly on access to the machinery of justice. They came to fruition
in an effort to keep the practice of law, so far as possible, in the hands of
those representing the rich and powerful. Reluctantly, the bar was forced to
accept changes in its rules that opened the gates to justice a little bit, and
belatedly invited in lawyers who were not white and male. Yet the driving
force of change in the past three decades has been the economic interest of
lawyers serving the interests of an increasingly centralized and monopolistic
economy. As the entities in that economy have become larger, they have
become multi-state and multi-national, defying the power of localized
governments to control them. The organization of big-time law practice has
followed this example. "Ethics" codes proscribe financial irregularity,' 28
126. The phrase has been widely used to describe the middle of the road, allegedly "ordinary"
man. In a mid-20th Century incarnation, the tastes of such a person were sometimes used as a test of
what is or is not obscene. See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST,
SHAME, AND THE LAW 134 (2004).
127. From one of Herbert's celebrated satirical essays, which one can find in, A.P. HERBERT,
UNCOMMON LAW (1935). The saying is also available at http://alittlebitofjake.wordpress.com/2006/
10/04/the-myth-of-the-reasonable-man-the-case-of-fardell-v-potts-a-p-herbert/.
128. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.5 (2010).
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lawyer inattention,' and conflicted representation, 3 o and provide penalties
for disobedience.' Notions of justice and public service are merely
aspirational. They are like column fillers and the weasel words in which
they are couched are gestures of surrender rather than declarations of
principle. They have become archeological evidence of moral obliquity.
If you are led by the high-minded language of professional
responsibility prefaces to believe that this is a system worthy of being
termed ethics, consider Samuel Butler's trenchant and analogous
commentary upon the Victorian-era church-goers of the English
countryside: "They would have been equally horrified at hearing the
Christian religion doubted, and at seeing it practised."1 32
V. WHAT ARE ETHIcs?
Professor Barrows Dunham, in his exciting book, Ethics Dead and
Alive, tells us:
Ethical theory differs from moral codes. The codes are lists of
admonitions, with little or no account of why they are binding. But
ethical theory undertakes to explain in some detail the principle of
right decision, of how one ought to make up one's mind.
Throughout this enterprise moves an effort to escape bias.
Mathematics and other sciences assert, or try to assert, what is the
case, regardless of what anyone wishes were the case. Similarly,
ethical theory asserts, or tries to assert, what ought to be chosen and
done, regardless of what anyone wishes were chosen and done. For,
just as the darkling flow of appetite and apprehension can dim
awareness of the world we act in, so also it can dim awareness of
what and how to decide. To pierce the shell of the self is, in ethics
or the sciences, a primary task, so that the self, emerging, may
know the world and what to do about it.
There are rules for all of this, and since they are still debated, I
suppose we must regard them as tinged with doubt. But the odd fact
is that there is less doubt about the rules than there is doubt about
our recognizing when the rules have been successfully applied.133
129. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.1 (2010).
130. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILrrY R. 1.7, 1.8 (2010).
131. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY R. 8.1, 8.5 (2010).
132. SAMUEL BUTLER, THE WAY OF ALL FLESH 43 (1903), available at http://www.gutenberg.
org/files/2084/2084-h/2084-h.htm.
133. BARROWS DUNHAM, ETHICS DEAD AND ALIVE 10-11 (1971).
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The study of ethics is about moving outside of self, to regard the "other"
as an end and not a means to be employed in the heedless service of self. If
Dunham's formulation makes sense, then these codes of professional
conduct are not ethics. They define a certain kind of agency relationship,
derived from ideas of contract and tinged with equitable notions of fiduciary
duty. The lawyer-agent performs agreed services. The duties of candor,
undivided loyalty, and not exploiting the lawyer's superior knowledge and
skill are all aspects of any fiduciary relationship. The very idea of such
relationships rests in turn on the equity jurisprudence that took shape in
England under the chancellors. Equity borrowed heavily from canon and
Roman law sources, as the chancellors were until Thomas More clerics, and
More defined himself as a devout as much as a common lawyer-and in the
end, even more.
When Shakespeare's character suggests to "kill all the lawyers," he
goes on to note that it was a lawyer-drawn parchment that bound him to the
land and work.13 4 The life, work, and ideology of lawyers, viewed as a
profession rather than focusing on individual cases, had to do with operating
within the set of agency rules in the service of power. Sometimes that
power held sway over the state. Sometimes groups of lawyers would enlist
in the service of power-in-waiting, power yet to be. Thus the English
common lawyers recast the law of royal prerogative, real property and
contract as part of the English Revolution. In the American colonies,
lawyers for influential merchants proclaimed indefeasible principles of
independence, not as free-standing ideals, but as instruments of liberation
from the colonial yoke. And when the dust of these conflicts had settled, it
was back to business as usual for the bar.
One could not expect more or better from the bar than what we have.
The lawyers make their own rules, and proclaim self-regulation as a core
value. They have a financial interest in organizing law practice in certain
ways. They deny having any enforceable compulsion to share legal services
with those who cannot afford them. And when the state intervenes to create
such a compulsion, bar associations come forward to deny that the state has
any such power. If, as Professor Dunham tell us, avoiding bias and self-
centeredness is central to developing a sense and structure of ethics, the
bar's regulatory codes are not about ethics at all.'
If you care about justice, are concerned about legal ethics properly so-
called, and wish to live a life that respects such values, what ought you to
do?
134. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 4, sc. 2.
135. DUNHAM, supra note 133, at 10-11.
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VI. INSIDE PASSAGE AND OUTSIDE PASSAGE
The rules of professional responsibility, and of contract and partnership
that govern jobs in the law, are there to be understood and observed. Some
of these rules are based on somebody's idea about the good society, but
taken as a whole they possess no more inherently moral content than the
speed limit. We can accept Holmes's "bad man" theory' 36 about them, or
we can justify some or all of them on some deeper basis, but they do not
provide any ethical direction for our lives.
We are left, I think, to accept Mr. Jones's advice that it is up to "the
integrity of the individual lawyer."' 37 That would be you, the reader. I do
not mean that we must abandon the quest for standards to govern lawyer
greed, lust, sloth, and other various deadly sins. Rather, we must
acknowledge that we must each take responsibility for finding and
following a path that fulfills a vision of justice.
When we look at younger lawyers today, we see waves of professional
and personal discontent as well as economic insecurity. Again, I have
written on this subject and will not repeat. If you are a lawyer or law
student facing such uncertainties, you have a personal decision to make. In
making it, you can look around and ask: Who are the lawyers whose lives
we justly celebrate and who seem to have had both success and personal
satisfaction? Professor Gerald Uelmen wrote a thoughtful article searching
for "lawyer of the century," that is the twentieth century.138 His first, and
perhaps most important, criterion was professional reputation-the opinion
of the lawyer's peers.139 That is a wise way of looking at the issue. If you
ask lawyers as a group to put limits on their own self-interest, you see what
we get in terms of codes of conduct. But Uelmen's question seems to call
for lawyers to identify praiseworthy qualities that rise above the pursuit of
selfish goals.' 40 And indeed, the polls of lawyers bear out this prediction.
Lawyers admire those of their peers who pursue justice for clients despite
public condemnation and personal sacrifice. They value qualities of
advocacy that enforce counter-majoritarian principles of justice. To put
matters cynically, lawyers laud selflessness so long as they are not
themselves required to practice it.
So in your quest, you could ask what lawyers say one ought to do, and
not what they, in their collective discussions, decide they are able to do. This
136. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
137. Jones, supra note 64, at 998.
138. Gerald Uelmen, Who is the Lawyer of the Century?, 30 INTL. Soc'Y BARRISTERS Q. 407
(2001).
139. Id. at 408.
140. See id. at 409.
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mode of reasoning one may call the inside passage. It speaks of a personal
quest informed by the judgments of those engaged in a similar quest. It is to
that extent self-referential. If you look around, you see dozens of
organizations devoted to causes that their organizers identify with justice. On
issues such as abortion, affirmative action, political campaign finance, and
criminal law, you can identify with any side of the issue. Since 2001, lawyers
have stepped up to represent those subject to torture and unlawful detention at
Guantanamo and elsewhere. Finally, some large law firms have taken up
these cases. I have much experience with these issues, and even with military
law. Yet the Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, Dennis Jacobs, recently gave a speech attacking those
lawyers, and deriding their claim to be truly interested in pursuit of justice-
prefacing his remark by noting "I know little of military law."l 4 1 He then
quotes F. Lee Bailey's praise of fairness in court martial proceedings, without
noting that Guantanamo detainees do not have the rights of a military court
martial defendant, nor that Bailey's reputation is hardly one on which to base
a sweeping conclusion.14 2 In short, the examples of those who claim to be
serving some ideal of justice do not teach a consistent lesson. The trumpets
are many, and make an uncertain sound.
Nor, I think, is one aided by most of what is called Critical Legal
Studies. This movement, which flourishes less now than formerly, seemed
to me principally occupied in promoting a kind of anomie in the face of
social conflict. The arguments of lawyers engaged in representing people in
trouble are labeled "rights rhetoric," which in turn is regarded as "unstable,
indeterminate, reifying, and of no utility." 4 3 This is not the place to debate
the strands of CLS thought. Professor Brian Leiter has recently provided
some helpful guidance. 14 My point is that the lawyer looking for
something other than an exit strategy finds little help there.
At best-and it is no inconsiderable gift-the inside passage is a
starting point. The example of lawyers who struggle for some idea of
justice gives us a clue about where to look for guidance. Let us look back at
Barrows Dunham's formulation: ethical theory moves us outside our self,
and even outside the collective "self' of a self-interested profession. 145it
141. Dennis Jacobs, Chief Justice, U.S. Ct. of Appeals, Address at the 10th Annual Barbara K.
Olson Memorial Lecture: Lawyers at War (Jan. 7, 2011) (transcript available at http://www.fed-
soc.org/publications/detail/lawyers-at-war).
142. See id.
143. Michael E. Tigar, Crime Talk, Rights Talk, and Double-Talk: Thoughts on Reading Encyclo-
pedia of Crime and Justice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 101, 119 (1986-87).
144. See, e.g., Brian Leiter, The Radicalism of Legal Positivism, 66 NAT'L LAW GUILD REV. 165
(2009) (for Leiter's delightful take-down).
145. DUNHAM, supra note 133, at 10-11.
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asks us to see where we are and what we are, in the most expansive possible
terms. The great majority of lawyers earn their livings by supporting and
defending things as they are and the people who own and control things as
they are. We have before us the examples of lawyers complicit in
horrendous conduct.
Where should we look? Not so hard, it seems to me. Human
experience defines claims for justice. We can see what kinds of norms are
properly labeled as progressive, at least in some discernible outline. Camus
wrote to a German friend at the close of World War H: "Qu'est-ce sauver
l'homme? Mais je vous le crie de tout moi-mime, c'est de ne pas le
mutiler et c'est donner ses chances h la justice, qu'il est le seul A
concevoir." 146 That is, "what will save Man? I cry out to you with all my
self, it is that one not mutilate him and to give him a chance for justice,
which he is the sole being to have conceived." 4 7 Interesting idea, that
humans have this characteristic of generalizing norms from experience. In a
celebrated dialogue with Robert Thurman, Deepak Chopra recalled the
thoughts of the Persian poet Rumi.14 8 Rumi tells of a man sitting in his
study and hearing an incessant knocking at his door. 14 9 Finally, he goes to
the door, only to find that the knocking has come from the inside.'50
A second observation is based on the writings of Professor Martha
Nussbaum, which I summarized back in 1995.'' I have provided this
summary below.
When I speak of a prosaic and down-to-earth idea of justice, I mean
simply that one can deduce principles of right from human needs in the
present time. That is, I reject the cynical, or Stoic, or no-ought-from-an-is
idea that one set of rules is just as good as another. I reject the notion, as
Professor Martha Nussbaum has characterized it, "that to every argument
some argument to a contradictory conclusion can be opposed; that
arguments are in any case merely tools of influence, without any better sort
of claim to our allegiance[.]"l 52 Rather, again borrowing from Professor
Nussbaum, my notions of justice "include a commitment, open-ended and
revisable because grounded upon dialectical arguments that have their roots
146. CHRISTINE MARGERRISON, ET AL., ALBERT CAMUS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A REASSESSMENT
OF His THINKING AT THE DAWN OF THE NEW MILLENIUM 232 (2008).
147. Id.
148. DEEPAK CHOPRA & ROBERT THURMAN, God and Buddha: A Dialogue (Mystic Fire Video
released Nov. 11, 2003).
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. Martha C. Nussbaum, Skepticism About Practical Reason in Literature and the Law, 107
HARV. L. REV. 714 (1994).
152. Id. at 716.
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in experience, to a definite view of human flourishing and good human
functioning."153 One element of such views is that "human beings have
needs for things in the world: for political rights, for money and food and
shelter, for respect and self-respect," and so on.' 5 4
Professor Tomiko Brown-Nagin has just published a book entitled
COURAGE TO DISSENT, which chronicles the decisions and struggles of civil
rights litigants.'5 5 The concept is refreshing. If we study how lawyers and
the system that calls itself justice affects the lives of people, we can have
some guidance as to how we might in today's situation organize our lives.
The choice of path depends on an understanding of the social, cultural and
historical context in which we are acting and the likely impact of our work
on those who depend upon us.
Lawyering on the edge puts adrenalin into one's system, and the
intensity that one feels leads to temptation. The temptation is to forget that
"it is not about me." When we remember who "it" is really "about," and the
likely consequences for them, we are on the path towards seeing a system of
ethics, properly so-called.
There is an international movement to recognize, restate, and advance
an ideal of human rights. Your job is to read deeply about the history of this
movement and to see that lawyers must define their tasks outside
themselves and outside the view of codes of professional conduct. One
must define the task in terms of peoples' demands for justice. To guide
you, there are stories of lawyers who have broken the mirror in which law is
accustomed to look at itself, and have trod a path towards justice. I
commend those stories to you. John R. Vile, in his GREAT AMERICAN
LAWYERS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA, profiles 110 lawyers whose career choices
and paths may provide examples.156 Professor Gerald Uelmen's article,
Who Is the Lawyer of the Century?, tells some stories of lawyers who you
may find worthy of emulation." 7 In my essay, The City Upon the Hill, in
the book RAISE THE BAR: REAL WORLD SOLUTIONS FOR A TROUBLED
PROFESSION,15 1 I discuss young lawyer dissatisfaction and some thoughts
on organizing one's way out of that state of mind. And in another essay,
153. Id. at 718.
154. Id.
155. TOMIKo BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2011).
156. JOHN R. VILE, GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA (2001).
157. Gerald F. Uelmen, Who Is the Lawyer of the Century?, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 613 (2000); see
also CALIFORNIA LAWYER MAGAZINE, February 2000, at 15 (reporting on California Attorneys for
Criminal Justice poll).
158. Michael E. Tigar, The City Upon the Hill, in RAISE THE BAR: REAL WORLD SOLUTIONS FOR
A TROUBLED PROFESSION 273 (Lawrence Fox ed., 2007).
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Narratives of Oppression,'5 9 I have discussed the challenge of representing
those whom society has cast out or marginalized. These works provide you
with just the beginnings. I will not go farther. Conclusions that you reach
yourself will belong to you more than those dictated by others. Conclusions
based on your own study of the historical, cultural, and social events and
movements that show where lawyers can make a difference will be more
likely to give you the satisfaction you seek. You must, in short, figure out
whose aspirations move you to employ your talents. 160  You are not
searching for a point of view, but for a philosophical system.
I am suggesting a method of study, and not a conclusion. To know the
experiences of those seeking justice, you must be with them. You will not
find the answers in lofty sentiment, or from the towers of professional
responsibility lore. As G.K. Chesterton has Father Brown say, "One sees
great things from the valley; only small things from the peak." 6 1
If you agree that these are difficult times, in a society riven with social
and economic divisions, you have a decision to make. In the 1930s, as the
power of fascism grew across the continent of Europe, talented intellectuals
faced the decision to engage or to retreat. Their dilemma, which is also
yours, was captured by Federico Garcia Lorca's poem, written shortly
before fascists murdered him:16 2
I have shut my balcony
For I do not wish to hear the weeping
But from beyond the grey walls
Nothing else is heard but the weeping
He cerrado mi balc6n
por que no quiero ofr el llanto
pero por detris de los grises muros
no se oye otra cosa que el Ilanto.163
159. Michael E. Tigar, Narratives of Oppression, 17 HUM. RIGHTS BRIEF 34 (2009).
160. In this quest, I suggest looking at John Berger's first novel, A Painter of Our Time. First
published in 1958, and then suppressed by its publisher for seven years. It reads today as chillingly
modem. Berger wrote an afterword to it in the 1988 paperback edition. The painter of the book, Janos
Lavin, understands that artists survive only from money from those who can afford to buy their work,
including state subsidies at times. There are parallels to the lives and choices of lawyers in this telling.
161. G.K. CHESTERTON, The Hammer of God, in THE INNOCENCE OF FATHER BROWN, 118 (2008),
available at http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/204/pg2O4.txt.
162. FEDERICO GARCIA LORCA, CASIDA DEL LLANTO, available at http://elpensador.info/pensa
miento/MTclMw/. The translation is mine. See also MICHAEL ROSSMAN, WINDS OF THE PEOPLE 3-4
(1986). This book is the text of a radio program commemorating the Spanish Civil War. Rossman's
translation is a little different from my own, but the differences arise from my own sense of the meter of
Lorca's original.
163. See id.
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